The virtual threat
The Internet has already forced wrenching
change on the financial-services industry—and the
revolution has barely begun, says Simon Long
THE
most remarkable thing about the effect of the Internet on
the financial-services sector is not how pervasive it has
been; it is how limited a transformation it has so far wrought.
Financial institutions, after all, deal in a product—money—that
for many of their customers has long been “virtual”.
Bank-account holders are used to the notion that their cash
is represented by a series of numbers on a monthly statement
generated by a computer, or by the glowing green figures
of a cash machine. And they have become accustomed to making
payments using pieces of plastic backed with a clever magnetic
strip. The Internet might have been designed for the distribution,
monitoring and management of this ubiquitous electronic
commodity.
More
worryingly for the firms that make their living out of arranging
financial transactions, the Internet might also have been
designed to do away with them. Banks and other financial
firms are intermediaries, standing between lenders and borrowers,
savers and spenders. For decades, banks in rich countries
have been fretting about how to cope with “disintermediation”:
lenders dealing direct with borrowers (as many do already
in the capital markets), without using a bank’s balance
sheet to add a layer of cost. The Internet is, potentially,
the greatest force for disintermediation the banks have
ever had to tackle. Other intermediaries, such as retailers,
face the same problem. But money, unlike, say, an item of
clothing, is a commodity that can actually be used, transferred
and delivered electronically.
Samuel
Theodore, of Moody’s, a credit-rating agency, believes
the banks are currently undergoing their “fourth disintermediation”.
The first involved savings, and the growth of mutual funds,
specialised pension funds and life-insurance policies at
the expense of bank deposits; the second saw the capital
markets take on some of the banks’ traditional role
as providers of credit; in the third, advances in technology
helped to streamline back-office operations. Now, in the
fourth stage, the distribution of banking products is being
disintermediated. This process has been going on for some
years, with the spread of automated teller machines (ATMs)
and, over the past decade or so, telephone banking and PC-based
proprietary systems; but the Internet hugely enlarges its
scope.
Spotty
youth
Yet,
except for one activity, share-trading, and one part of
the world, Scandinavia, Internet-based financial retailing
is, if not in its infancy, then scarcely at puberty. And
wholesale banking, although it relies heavily on complex
electronic trading systems and information technology, is
still conducted mostly on closed proprietary networks. To
be sure, there are some signs that the disintermediation
the industry fears may be starting. Internet banks, with
their low costs—and their dot.com habit of paying
more attention to the acquisition of customers than the
turning of profits—have drawn deposits away from off-line
banks in some countries. And in the capital markets, bond
issues and share offerings have been syndicated and distributed
over the Internet. Some highly rated borrowers have for
years been borrowing through their own issues of commercial
paper. The Internet can only enhance the appeal of do-it-yourself
fund-raising.
But
these are just the early signs of an upheaval that is gathering
momentum by the day. There are a number of reasons why many
online financial services have been slow to catch on, and
why they can now be expected to develop faster. Concerns
about the security of Internet transactions, a particularly
important issue for financial dealings, are gradually being
eased. Internet use, even in the rich world, has been patchy,
but is spreading fast. And whereas conducting financial
transactions online up to now has often been clunky and
annoying, the technology is improving all the time. Those
technological advances are also liberating the Internet
from the confines of the PC.
Most
important, financial institutions themselves, which in the
past have often resisted change, may now become its most
ardent promoters. Having invested heavily in their own systems,
banks were understandably reluctant to jettison them for
web-based replacements. And adapting their own processes
for the Internet has often proved cumbersome and difficult.
Moreover, until recently banks faced little pressure from
their customers to change what were seen as useful but boring
services, much the same as electricity and gas. But soon,
in many countries, customers will expect an online service
as a matter of course.
The
banks' staff, too, have been reluctant to abandon the old
ways of doing things. Besides, those old ways have often
been extremely profitable, so change threatens not just
working habits, but the bottom line too. Now, however, almost
every financial firm, from the swankiest Wall Street investment
bank to the provider of microcredit to the very poor, has
found that it has no choice but to invest in an “Internet
strategy”. And having invested in it, it will need
to persuade its customers to use it. So in areas where the
advantages of doing business online may not be obvious to
the consumer—notably in retail banking—the banks
may find themselves trying to coax, bribe and bully reluctant
customers online.
The
banks' conservatism, on which they used to pride themselves,
has become an embarrassment. It has also been spotted by
the new breed of Internet entrepreneur taking aim at the
banks’ business. The models are firms such as E*Trade
and Charles Schwab, discount stockbrokers that found in
the Internet a means of challenging even the biggest and
most prestigious traditional firms. Now commercial and investment
banks, fund managers and financial advisers are all vying
with each other to present themselves as Internet-savvy,
and boasting about their investment in online services.
All
this has created a strange, contradictory world. Clever
young things with a bright idea and a few million dollars
of venture capital behind them talk cheerily of the demise
of traditional banks. Bill Gates, no less, said six years
ago that banking is necessary, but banks are not. Now, the
story goes, they are irredeemably hampered by their “legacy
systems”—their existing management structures,
staffing levels and computers—and by their “channel
conflicts”—between what they do now, and online
methods of sales and distribution. Their bosses simply do
not “get it”. Or, even if they do, their institutions
are so deeply rooted in the old economy and pre-Internet
styles of business that there is no point in turning them
around.
The
dinosaurs in the supposedly stuffy offices of these big
banks and securities firms appear unaware that a meteorite
may be on its way to obliterate them. On the contrary, resolutely
upbeat online-service managers, often rather self-conscious
in their tieless, suitless new-economy uniforms, claim they
are having the times of their lives. Never has technology
revealed so many new avenues for developing the business.
It is, says Denis O’Leary, who runs Chase Manhattan’s
Chase.com, “a golden age”.
Not
least because, in the industrialized West, many firms have
been making bigger profits than ever. Years of economic
expansion and bull markets have yielded good income from
traditional lending, from trading and from investment. The
only obvious cloud in the sky is that banks’ share
prices seem not to reflect this (see chart
1). Indeed, in some countries, such as Britain, they imply
that the market expects banks’ profits to collapse
in the next few years. Even the stockmarket seems to believe
the dot.com wannabes, and rewards them with much richer
valuations than boring old-economy banks.
Still kicking
And
yet this survey will argue that many of the older institutions
have a good story to tell. The “legacy systems”
at which the upstarts scoff have one big virtue: they have
tended, by and large, to work. Big banks process trillions
of dollars a day. It is almost inconceivable that they might
close down for a few hours because some clever Internet
saboteur has found a way of snarling up their technology
(as has recently happened to some of the biggest websites).
Existing banks have customers in numbers that newcomers
can only dream of, and even unpopular incumbents benefit
from their customers’ inertia.
The
Internet also brings established firms huge opportunities
as well as threats. To take two important examples, it offers
ways of cutting costs and of marketing products much more
efficiently. For years, in America, Europe, Japan and elsewhere,
the industry has been consolidating: bank after bank has
been taken over by or teamed up with an institution in a
complementary line of business. Usually, these deals are
justified to shareholders by the extra returns that can
be generated once overlapping costs are stripped out. The
Internet, potentially, offers a way of taking a knife to
whole layers of costs. Once a customer is convinced to carry
out most of his transactions online, his account becomes
much cheaper to administer.
The
other much-cited benefit of consolidation is “cross-selling”—of
insurance policies to bank-account holders, for example.
Yet so far this has rarely been all that successful in practice.
The Internet can be a precision-guided marketing tool. For
example, if you apply online for a credit card from NextCard,
an American Internet operation, you will be offered a choice
of three charging structures. To qualify for the most favourable,
you have to transfer a certain outstanding balance from
your other credit cards. That sum will—fancy that!—be
the actual total of your other balances, which NextCard
has just ascertained online from the credit bureaus. Or,
in wholesale finance, suppose you are a potential investor
in a company’s initial public offering of shares,
and have just finished watching the boss boosting his company’s
prospects on Merrill Lynch’s online investment-banking
service. The phone rings. And yes, it is a Merrill Lynch
salesman who knows you have been watching, and thinks that
now may be the moment to clinch a sale.
But,
for banks, each of these pluses comes with a minus. Because
costs are so much lower for Internet-based transactions,
the barriers to entry are lower as well, which implies that
margins will come under pressure. And although the Internet
makes well-directed sales pitches easier, that is hardly
compensation for the precariousness of online customer relationships.
Once your client is on the Internet, he is only a mouse-click
away from your competitor, and more and more financial sites,
search engines and portals will be pushing competing products
at him. That, too, will squeeze margins.
Viewed
from this perspective, for many financial institutions the
Internet is a double bind. Embrace it, and you may still
find yourself losing business, or at least seeing profit
margins dwindle. But ignoring it could be terminal. This
survey will argue that the pressures for change have become
irresistible. It concentrates on places where the process
is most advanced—America and Europe—but the
same lessons apply everywhere. Big financial institutions
are global firms. And on the Internet, change spreads like
wildfire. The stockmarket with the highest proportion of
Internet trading is not, as you might think, in New York,
but in Seoul.
To make
the challenge for the industry even more daunting, the revolution
also encompasses the very architecture of many of the world’s
biggest financial markets. Stock, commodity and futures
exchanges, clearing and settlement systems are also being
forced to consolidate and modernize, to prepare for the
day when financial transactions are settled instantaneously.
In public,
no bank boss these days would admit to anything less than
wholehearted enthusiasm for the online adventure. In private,
however, some still see it as just another distribution
channel, perhaps less important than others, such as the
telephone. A few still cling to the dream that it is a fad
they have to indulge because their shareholders seem to
like it. Even such non-believers, however, are being forced
by the market to formulate an online strategy. If they are
too slow, or get it wrong, the consequences for their firms
could be deadly. And if they still need convincing, they
need only look at what has happened, in just four years,
to stockbroking.